Britain had a complicated and worsening relationship with Egypt in the post-war period. The surrender of the British Mandate of Palestine in 1948 was one of the factors that led to the formation of Israel, which in turn led to ‘a serious loss of goodwill from the Arab world towards Britain’ (Robinson, 2001, 410). British military presence in Egypt and continued control (along with France) of the Suez Canal, were further sources of discord. The British conceded to the withdrawal of troops in 1954. The nationalisation of the canal by the Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser in July 1956 provided the spark for conflict in the region.

Nasser came to power in 1954. During his initial period of rule his position was insecure, and it has been argued that this encouraged him to campaign against British influence in the Middle East, aiming to bolster his power (Barnett, 1992, 82-83). In turn, the British launched a propaganda campaign against Nasser, portraying him as a fanatic dictator and a Soviet ‘stooge’ (Shaw, 1996, 12). The countries of the United Nations debated how to respond to the nationalisation of the canal. While Britain, France and Israel contemplated co-ordinated action, the United States, now the most important outside power in the region, would not support the use of force (Hulbert, 2002, 263).

Secretly supported by Britain and France, Israel launched an attack on Egypt on 29 October 1956. Two days later, Britain and France ‘intervened’, planning to use the Egypt-Israel conflict as justification for renewed control of the Suez Canal. Among the most controversial aspects of the Anglo-French campaign was the attack upon the city of Port Said. This ‘peacekeeping’ mission resulted in an estimated 1,000 Egyptian fatalities, while in response 23 British and French military personnel were killed (Kyle, 2003, 502-03). In addition, around 900 Egyptians required hospital treatment, in comparison to the 121 injured members of the Anglo-French forces (Kyle, 2003, 503, 641). Although the city was not widely damaged, a block of houses was destroyed by air strikes, the shanty town was burnt down, and the Navy House was blown up (Kyle, 2003, 503).

Tony Shaw claims that Nasser was ‘deeply conscious of the power of propaganda’ (Shaw, 1996, 4). He publicised the attack on Port Said with ‘articles, films, photographs and specially commissioned magazines’ that were distributed widely and aimed in particular at the United States (Shaw, 1996, 179). Most damaging for his opponents was an article by the Swedish journalist Olof Perelew Andressen, which claimed that British and French troops had killed between 7,000 and 12,000 civilians in the city (Kyle, 2003, 641). The Anglo-French operation drew criticism from all quarters. The United Nations convened for an ‘emergency special session’ between 1 and 10 November 1956, which established the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and called for an immediate ceasefire (United Nations, 1-10 November 1956). The British agreed to these terms, and announced a ceasefire on 6 November 1956, while troops were still on operational manoeuvres in Port Said. In December 1956 British and French troops were withdrawn from the city and replaced by Danish and Colombian units of the UNEF.

It has been argued that the British government’s public relations policy during the crisis was a ‘disaster’ (Hulbert, 2002, 264). Tony Shaw counters that ‘the British government appreciated the importance of “presenting” its policy to a far greater extent than the public then realized and historians have given it credit’ (Shaw, 1996, 1-2). Suez in Perspective is one of three films that the Central Office of Information had in production as early as November 1956, the others being The Facts about Port Said and Report from Port Said (‘Films on Suez’). The film was made as a response to Egyptian propaganda, including the film The Anglo-French Aggression Against Egypt (1956). It was designed to ‘explain from the British point of view […] the events which led to action by the Israelis against Egypt and the consequential action by the British and French to safeguard the Suez Canal’ (‘Films on Suez’). The COI commissioned the newsreel company British Movietone to make the film, and it is largely made up of the company’s own library footage. It does, however, include material commissioned by the COI, such as the aerial documentation of Port Said and the shots of the blockships in the Canal (Pring, 14 December 1956; ‘Cutter’s Shot List’). Suez in Perspective was not intended for audiences in the UK; its distribution instead being designated as ‘World Comprehensive’, with its ‘major showings’ intended for ‘specially invited audiences by Overseas Missions’ (‘Show Copy Approved’; ‘Films on Suez’). The film was dubbed into numerous languages, including French, Italian, Finnish, Serbo-Croat, Latin-American Spanish, Arabic, Urdu, Hindi, Bengali, and Sinhalese, while a special German version was made in Germany (‘Showing of Films on Suez’). In the first week of December 1956 alone, nearly 200 prints were despatched by air to over seventy different territories (‘Showing of Films on Suez’).