Frank Welsh has argued that ‘The great achievement of Japanese rule in Hong Kong was to convince the Chinese population that, by comparison with that of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, British rule was both benign and competent’ (Welsh, 1993, 420-21). Following the surrender of British colonial officials on 25 December 1941 the Japanese ruled Hong Kong for a period of three years and eight months. During this time the territory was subject to martial law. It has been estimated that over ten thousand Hong Kong civilians were executed (Welsh, 1993, 421). A further 7000 British residents were held in prisoner-of-war or internment camps. The Japanese commandeered or destroyed properties in order to serve their military interests. They also assumed control of trading activities, replacing the Hong Kong dollar with the military yen. The majority of factories were taken over by the Japanese. There were shortages of fuel and public transport, and utilities routinely failed. Allied air attacks compounded Hong Kong’s straitened circumstances. A shortage of food, housing and medical provisions encouraged a Japanese policy of repatriation. The population of Hong Kong declined from 1.6 million in 1941 to 600,000 in 1945 as residents were forcibly returned to mainland China (Bradsher, 18 April 2005).

There was disagreement among the Allied nations regarding who should assume control of Hong Kong following the end of the war. The Chinese government regarded Hong Kong as rightfully theirs. In addition, they believed that they should receive territorial concessions as a reward for their participation in the war (Welsh, 1993, 422-23). The American government, particularly during the period of Roosevelt’s presidency, was largely supportive of Chinese claims. There was also a belief in the Foreign Office of the British government that Hong Kong should no longer be part of the Empire. The Colonial Office and Winston Churchill disagreed, however, and support for the British case increased as the weaknesses of the then Chinese regime became apparent. Eventually  Hong Kong returned to British rule. The American command in the Far East gave British forces permission to retake the territory. The incumbent American president, Harry S. Truman, meanwhile assured China that this action did not reflect future US policy on Hong Kong (Welsh, 1993, 430).

Philip Snow claims that during the scenes of liberation by the British, the ‘White Sun’ nationalist flag ‘outnumbered the Union Jacks by four to one’ (Snow, 2004, 259). Frank Welsh believes, however, that for Hong Kong’s residents ‘practical difficulties’ were more pressing than their political concerns (Welsh, 1993, 432). The new military administration worked quickly. Free food supplies were provided and over 30,000 coolies were employed to help repair the damage wrought by the Japanese. The Hongkong and Shanghai Bank restored Hong Kong’s currency and provided funds to enable public utilities to function. It is Steve Tsang’s belief that the restoration of British administration in Hong Kong was the ‘most shining example of all the territories liberated from the Japanese’ (Tsang, 1997, 53). Welsh concurs, stating that the speed and success of this post-war readjustment was ‘unparalleled elsewhere’ (Welsh, 1993, 433). He argues that, as a result, ‘Confidence in British rule, shattered by the experiences of 1941, was regained’ (Welsh, 1993, 433). Snow, however, is more cautious. He remarks that ‘Behind all the panoply of their re-entry, behind the grim grey warships and shining white uniforms, the British rulers of Hong Kong were feeble as never before’ (Snow, 2004, 264-65). He futher argues that patrolling the streets and shepherding Japanese troops into POW camps was the limit of the military’s power; meanwhile the urban areas of Hong Kong ‘lay prostrate to the mercy of Triad gangs’, while in the countryside ‘the British had no kind of a grip at all’ (Snow, 2004, 265).