In 1841 the British Navy captured Hong Kong Island during the First Opium War with China (Melson, 1997, 4). The following year, Hong Kong Island was formally ceded to Britain under the Treaty of Nanking. In the latter half of the nineteenth century neighbouring areas were also gained by Britain, culminating with the 1898 Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, under which the British secured a lease from the Qing Dynasty giving them full jurisdiction over the remaining land in the surrounding area. This 99-year lease was due to expire on 30 June 1997, a situation that led the governments of Britain and the People’s Republic of China to produce the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. With this declaration the British government agreed that, when the lease expired, they would surrender sovereignty of the leased territories, as well as Hong Kong Island and Kowloon; in return, the Chinese government agreed to operate a ‘one country, two systems’ policy in Hong Kong, which would enable its capitalist system to continue.

The continued British rule of Hong Kong had gone ‘against the decolonisation grain’ that had been evident elsewhere in the Empire following the Second World War (Buckley, 1997, 170). Roger Buckley believes that the British remained in Hong Kong for so long because it was mutually beneficial to all parties concerned: ‘the British government could point to its administrative successes, the Chinese had the satisfaction of knowing that over half of its trade passed through Hong Kong by the early 1990s and the residents of the territory could expect to be left to get on with their own affairs’ (Buckley, 1997, 171). Steve Tsang believes that the situation finally changed because of a tilt in the balance of power: Britain knew that it could not win a war with China to keep control of the territory, meanwhile both countries ‘accepted that Hong Kong had become too valuable to risk its destruction’ (Tsang, 2004, 268). The transfer of power was not entirely smooth, however. Chris Patten, the last Governor of Hong Kong, angered the Chinese government when he introduced measures that aimed to reinforce democratic power within the territory (Buckley, 1997, 127-35; Tsang, 1997, 189-200).

Although the British government retained overall control of Hong Kong until the handover, in the run-up to this transfer there were some marked changes in the way the territory was run. Discounting the Governor, the senior posts in the Hong Kong government were all held by non-Europeans (Buckley, 1997, 146). Meanwhile, responsibility for security was transferred from the British military to the local Hong Kong police (Buckley, 1997, 147). Buckley believes that Chris Patten was responsible for the ‘symbolic undermining of British military prestige in Hong Kong’, as he took the decision to remove the military presence from Hong Kong’s executive council (Buckley, 1947, 147).

During the early 1990s the Royal Navy was reduced to operating a ‘handful of patrol boats’ (Buckley, 1947, 147). Their role in Hong Kong during this period was search and rescue, the capture of illegal immigrants, and the prevention of smuggling (Melson, 1997, 129-46). In April 1993 the Navy’s last remaining coastal watching station in Hong Kong was closed down, and in May 1993 HMS Tamar, the Navy’s base in central Hong Kong, was sold off for land development (Melson, 1997, 150). The ships of the Hong Kong squadron took part in the handover ceremonies, but they were then sold on to the Philippines Navy. Following the Chinese takeover, the Navy’s base on Stonecutters Island became the government dockyard, and the Prince of Wales Barracks became the headquarters of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Hong Kong Garrison (Melson, 1997, 150-58).

30 June 1997 was seen by many as the date on which Britain’s imperial role finally came to an end. Many of these ambitions were achieved with the support of the British Navy, and the date was certainly seen as significant within that organisation. Lieutenant Commander G. Tilsey remarked that ‘30^th June 1997 will see the Royal Navy’s final sunset on a British Hong Kong. The Navy has been the guardian and protector here for many years, in a more direct manner than anywhere else in the world. From the congested waters of Victoria Harbour to the choppy, muddy seas of Mirs Bay, the Royal Navy has provided deterrence, support and protection – perhaps the last of this sort of extended, permanent, patrolling presence that the UK will ever require East of Suez’ (Melson, 1997, 159).

Hong Kong Handover was shot by Sergeant Stuart McKenzie of the Headquarters Land Command Mobile News Team. While earlier military film units shot their footage for the historical record and for publicity purposes, the Mobile News Team was primarily concerned with public relations, and often shot footage that concentrated on individual servicemen, with the aim of securing publicity on regional television.