This Modern Age Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Rank Organization, produced 41 issues of the theatrical magazine film, This Modern Age, between September 1946 and January 1951. British film historian Leo Enticknap notes that more than half of these (22) dealt with foreign affairs and, of these, 8 discussed the ‘forthcoming or putative independence of British Empire colonies and protectorates’ (Enticknap, 2000, 215).

The first of these was Palestine (1947), which Enticknap suggests was a ‘representative example’ as it presented the subject as a ‘filmed debate’ and was also the ‘first to be advertised and marketed in a way that stressed editorial impartiality’. Both the films and the publicity surrounding the release of these imperial subjects emphasised their even-handedness. In describing the series in 1950, the series distributor, GFD (General Film Distributors), wrote that ‘This Modern Age is not biased in any way… their [foreign] difficulties are boldly explained and all possible solutions given a hearing’ (Enticknap, 1999, 127, 131). In October 1950, Today’s Cinema wrote, with reference to The Fight in Malaya, that ‘The only possible fault that can be found with the films of this series dealing with foreign problems is that, in their commendable efforts to tell the unbiased truth, they sometimes lack the urgent dramatic quality that would, from the popular point of view, make such subjects more interesting’ (Enticknap, 1999, 138). Enticknap argued that the films often sought to counteract this problem by utilising other devices, noting as an example the ‘high quality synchronised recording of tribal rituals in “The Future of One Million Africans”’ (Enticknap, 1999, 146).

This Modern Age was distributed in Britain by GFD, and positioned as 20-minute items on a supporting programme. The Future of One Million Africans played on the Gaumont Circuit with Woman on the Run and Wyoming Mail, while it was also available for educational purposes in America through British Information Services (Eyles, 1996, 191).

Although the High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland were excluded from the Union when it achieved independence in 1910, Section 151 of the South Africa Act had anticipated their eventual transfer into the Union. The timing of this transfer, and the vagaries of this section, were widely debated over the next forty years, as a succession of South African governments called for their incorporation. This came to a head when Dr D. F. Malan’s Nationalist Government assumed power in 1948. Malan sought the complete removal of imperial control from South Africa and warned at the Commonwealth Conference of 1949 that his government was preparing a petition to the British government for their transfer. He emphasised, in particular, the territories’ economic dependency on South Africa, arguing in February 1950 that no other Commonwealth state would tolerate ‘being compelled to harbour territories, entirely dependent upon her economically and largely also for their defence, but belonging to and governed by another country’ (Spence, 1964, 242). Malan presented this as a slight on South Africa’s Commonwealth status, arguing that South Africa ‘feels herself relegated to the position of a semi-independent and third class country. South Africa feels she has good reason to be impatient’ (The Times, 7 February 1951, 6). Malan’s rhetoric of impatience, led many people, according to South African writer C.J. Driver, to fear that an ‘Anschluss was imminent’ (Driver, 2000, 76).

Given the racial politics of the Nationalist administration, the transfer of the territories assumed greater political significance. The Liberal Party organised a demonstration opposing the proposed transfer in May 1950, at which Lady Violet Bonham Carter, the Vice President of the party, complained ‘We are about to be asked to betray our solemn obligation to the peoples of these territories, and hand them over to what is virtually slave status’ (The Times, 17 May, 1950, 3). Malan’s demands, which would effectively see the extension of his segregationist policies to these territories, challenged Britain’s publicly promoted liberal imperialism and came at a moment when Britain was increasing its expenditure on colonial welfare and development as well as seeking to retain influence and support within its African colonies. However, the British Government was, as a Times editorial acknowledged, in an ‘exceptionally weak position’ after its handling of the Seretse Khama affair (The Times, 15 April 1950, 7). Seretse Khama, the heir to the largest kingdom in Bechuanaland, had married his English secretary, and in deference to outraged white South African sentiment, Britain had exiled the pair in 1951. A suppressed parliamentary report deemed him eminently fit for rule but for his ‘unfortunate marriage’. This, in turn, served to greatly undermine British authority within Bechuanaland, while also generating protests within Britain (Butler, 2002, 96).

Malan continued to argue that the situation with the territories was ‘untenable’, and by 1952 had become an ‘acute’ problem. His successor J.G. Strijdom also demanded their inclusion within the Union, and even as late as 1963 South Africa made one final appeal. However, historian Francis Wilson argued that by the 1960s the South African government welcomed the territories’ impending independence. The territories had become homes for many political refugees and the government feared that they might become bases for operations against the Republic. By excluding the territories from the Union, the government was able to declare these Africans as foreigners and to prevent them from interfering in the country’s internal affairs. The government policy thus shifted in the course of a decade from ‘incorporation to a policy of dispossession’ (Crowder, 1984, 301).